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Abstract:   In the wake of recent failures of risk management, there has been a widespread
call for improved quantification of the financial risks facing firms. At the forefront of this
clamor has been Value at Risk. Previous research has identified differences in models, or
Model Risk, as an important impediment to developing a Value at Risk standard. By
contrast, this paper considers the divergence in a model's implementation in software and
how it too, affects the establishment of a risk measurement standard. Different leading risk
management systems' vendors were given identical portfolios of instruments of varying
complexity, and were asked to assess the value at risk according to one common model, J.P.
Morgan's RiskMetrics™. We analyzed the VaR results on a case by case basis, and in terms
of prior expectations from the structure of financial instruments in the portfolio, as well as
prior vendor expectations about the relative complexity of different asset classes. It follows
that this research indicates the extent to which one particular model of risk can be
effectively specified in advance, independent of the model's detailed implementation and
use in practice.
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In the wake of several high-profile failures of risk management (such as Barings Bank,
Metallgesellschaft, and Orange County), there has been a widespread call for better
quantification of the financial risks facing corporate and financial service firms. At the
forefront of this clamor for a standardized risk measure has been Value at Risk, or VaR as
it is commonly known. VaR is simply defined as the expected minimum loss of a
portfolio over some time period for some level of probability. VaR’s popularity is based
on its ability to aggregate several components of firm wide market risk into a single
number. Moreover, it focuses on a major concern of senior managers, the potential for
significant loss in a firm’s portfolio of assets. In its various forms, VaR has also gained
strong support from industry and regulatory bodies such as the Group of Thirty (G30
1993), the Bank for International Settlements (Settlements 1994), and the European
Union.
1 Proponents of VaR believe it will replace or at least complement less
standardized techniques such as Asset/Liability Management and Stress testing, and as a
result, it is hoped that regulators, auditors, shareholders and management, will finally be
speaking a common language with respect to risk.
1.1 A Brief Description Of The Study
But while the concept of VaR is straightforward, it’s implementation is not. There are a
variety of models and model implementations that produce very different estimates of the
risk for the same portfolio. While previous studies have focused on how differences
between models
2 cause variation in VaR, this study considers how differences in the
implementations of the same model produce variation in VaR. These issues are critical for
practitioners; divergence in models and implementations leads to uncertainty in the mind
1 The European Union’s Capital Adequacy Directive makes the VaR of the market risk in a bank’s trading
book one input to the calculation of their capital reserve requirement. For banks in the Group of Ten
countries, the Basle committee on Banking supervision is proposing allocating risk capital according to
banks’ internal VaR models.
2 In this paper, the term “model”, denotes a system of postulates and data together with a means of
drawing dynamic inferences from them. See for example, Derman (1996).
3of the end user as to the meaning of the VaR estimates. This uncertainty translates to the
real risk that the VaR estimates are used inappropriate y. To understand the importance
of this risk in the estimation of VaR, we developed a test portfolio (see Appendix), which
was given to a number of leading risk management software vendors, all of whom
advertised that they used the same model of risk, J.P. Morgan’s RiskMetrics™, and
obtained their estimates for the portfolio’s VaR. The results were analyzed and are
discussed below.
1.2 Previous Research
This work builds on earlier research describing different models of VaR most notably,
Tanya Beder’s (1995) comparison of simulation and parametric models of VaR, and more
recently, Daryll Hendricks (1996) comparison of random foreign exchange portfolios
using different VaR models over multiple dates. Beder applied eight different approaches
to three hypothetical portfolios and found VaR results varying by a factor of 14. She
explained this by noting VaR’s extreme sensitivity to the modeler’s choice of parameters,
data, assumptions and methodology. Hendricks compared twelve value-at-risk models to
1,000 randomly chosen FX portfolios. Using nine criteria to evaluate model performance,
he found less variance than did Beder, noting that the different models generally capture
the risk that they set out to assess and tend to produce risk estimates that are similar in
average size. Our study differs from the previous research in two critical respects; first,
our intent is not to compare different models, rather to understand the importance of the
real world implementation and use of just one of these models. Secondly, our study
focuses on different commercially available systems used by different individuals rather
than specially constructed test systems used by the same individual. We suggest that this
makes for a more realistic test of the use and interpretation of systems’ results.
1.3 Models of VaR and Systems Risk
There are a variety of models that may be used to estimate Value at Risk. For instance,
some risk management systems allow user-defined simulations, or use scenario-based
models to calculate VaR. These techniques, and the circumstances in which they, and the
4tools that implement them, are most appropriate, are described elsewhere, e.g., Leong
(1996). However, the most widely used technique to calculate VaR utilizes historical
covariances between different risk factors to assess the effect of shocks on a portfolio
whose positions can be mapped to those risk factors.
3 One such parametric model is J.P.
Morgan’s RiskMetrics™, and given its widespread use, we believe it is timely to ask to
what extent this particular model provides a  lingua franca  for risk measurement.
Updated daily across the Internet
4, RiskMetrics™ correlations and volatilities allow users
to assess their aggregate financial market risks (in terms of VaR) over a given time period
consistently across different asset classes. And, in an effort to make the use of the
datasets more transparent, J.P. Morgan have also made public the detailed model by
which these volatilities and correlations are calculated and the manner in which they
should be used (Guldimann 1995). While this model has been criticized as making overly
simplistic assumptions, we note that models are invariably compromises between
usability on the one hand and accuracy on the other; RiskMetrics™ focuses on providing
a relatively simple and transparent tool (Longerstaey and Zangari 1995).
6
Despite RiskMetrics™’ popularity, the question remains whether this or any other
mode1
7, can constitute a standard independent of the details of the model’s
implementation and use. This is no new notion; it was Till Guldimann, one of the
architects of RiskMetrics™, who observed that  “risk measurement and management
continues to be as much a craft as it is a science” and that “no amount of sophisticated
analytics will replace experience and professional judgment in managing risks”.
8
3See Beckstrom’s (1995) introductory guide to the meaning and use of VaR.
4Fromhttp://www.J.P.Morgan.com/RiskMetrics.
5Lawrence and Robinson (1995) criticize some of RiskMetrics’ assumptions, such as its choice of 95%
confidence interval, the assumption of normal markets, and its decision to ignore information in implied
volatilities.
6It follows that our test of this model probably underestimates the extent of systems risk involved in
more complex models.
7There are several other models of Value at Risk, such as Bankers Trust’s RAROC 2020, and CS First
Boston’s PrimeRisk. From the perspective of this research however, RiskMetrics has the important
advantage in that it is widely used, formally described and publicly available.
8 See Guldimann (1995).
5The formal model is not, and may never be a complete description of the precise
implementation of the model in every circumstance, because of the potentially infinite
variety of instruments and the large number of markets, whose institutional and statistical
attributes are varying over time. This incompleteness of the model implies that decisions
are left to the systems developer who chooses to implement the model and the systems
user who interprets the inputs and outputs. It is these decisions that we suspect lead to
variance in the outputs produced by the different systems, even though they utilize the
same formal model. It follows, that unlike the earlier studies of Beder and Hendricks
which focused on variance caused by a diversity of models, i.e., Model Risk, in this paper,
we are concerned with that variance caused by a diversity of implementations of the same
model, i.e., Systems Risk. We believe that a necessary condition for the use of any model
as a potential standard is that it involves limited or at least quantifiable Systems Risk.
This is especially important in the case of VaR, where the typical user of the VaR results,
senior management, is often not a specialist in financial models and systems, and therefore
tends to take the outputs from the models and systems at face value, partially oblivious
of Model Risk and almost totally unaware of Systems Risk.
1.4 Research Goals
These goals are four-fold:
. To assess the variance in VaR estimates produced by different commercial
implementations of the same model of Value at Risk.
. To assess how such variance is dependent on the nature of the asset class,
. To compare these results with the prior expectations of the vendors and those of the
researchers, based on the portfolio’s structure.
. Finally, to understand the extent of Systems Risk in the provision of any potential
standard for risk measurement.
9 Note: That different model and system developers make different assumptions does not imply that they
are in error. Rather, it should be inferred that an assumption’s “correctness” is really an evolving social
62. RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1 Research Participants
As of the initial date of this study, twenty two vendors were known to have incorporated
J.P. Morgan’s RiskMetrics™ model into their assessments of Value at Risk, and all were
asked to participate in the study. The following vendors completed VaR estimates for all
or part of the test portfolio: Algorithmic, Brady, C-ATS Software, Dow Jones/Telerate,
Financial Engineering Associates, Infinity, Price Waterhouse, Renaissance, Softek, True
Risk, and Wall Street Systems.
2.2 Research Process
The extensive test portfolio is summarized in the appendix and was designed to assess the
capabilities of all the tools and to produce a fair, but comprehensive and realistic test of
their VaR capabilities, We also produced instructions describing the appropriate
parameterizations to be used for the test. When the VaR estimates were returned, they
were compared and analyzed, and feedback given to the vendors regarding any major
discrepancies. 
10 In many cases, vendors explained their need to change their results; the
new results and the explanations for the changes were incorporated into the final report.
When a sufficient number of results were gathered, they were analyzed on a case by case
basis and also in terms of several prior hypotheses. A complete analysis was given to
vendors describing all the results and made public in summary articles such as this. To
encourage vendor participation, the details of which vendors gave particular results were
not revealed.
2.3 The Risk Assessment Task
The task facing vendors involved several elements: First, Inputs; Most critical was the
test portfolio describing positions in various asset classes, including Government Bonds,
construct, based on accepted practice. Assumptions also differ from errors; in this paper, the term
is limited to describing inconsistencies between assumptions within the same model or system.
“Error”
7Interest Rate Swaps, Money Market Deposits, FX Forwards, FRAs, FX Options and
Interest Rate Options.
11 Vendors were also given identical RiskMetrics™ datasets.
Second, vendors were asked to produce Outputs of one day, 95% confidence, USD Daily
Earnings at Risk (DEaR) estimates of interest rate, foreign exchange and total risk for the
each asset class in the test portfolio as of 10.30 am EST, September 27, 1995. The final
element of the risk assessment task was the following schedule of Parameter Settings:
2.4 Research Issues
Gaining the cooperation of the vendors was a major challenge. Some vendors were busy
with software releases, others reluctant to commit to a project that might reveal awkward
discrepancies. One vendor reasoned that VaR was such a relatively small part of their
system’s total functionality, that any cross-tool survey based on VaR could not do them
justice. In the light of these challenges, one of the more impressive aspects of the study,
is that we obtained as extensive cooperation as we did—securing the involvement of a
large proportion of the major risk management systems vendors. Nevertheless the size of
10 
Vendors were informed of the median and the standard deviation of the sample of VaR results by asset
class. We also drew the vendor’s attention to outliers.
8the sample was clearly limited and limiting. To mitigate against this, we triangulated the
quantitative results with prior structural analysis of the portfolio, and with vendor
expectations regarding the complexity of different asset classes. Working through several
iterations of estimates from vendors
12also limited the importance of User Risks 
13, System
Errors and User Errors in the results. 
14 Testing vendors’ systems rather than end-users’
systems allowed us to mitigate against User Risk and User Errors, since it is reasonable to
assume that vendors know how to use their own systems better than do their customers.
This follows because vendors are more likely to use their systems in the standard manner
in which it was designed (mitigating User Risk), and are less likely to make inconsistent
assumptions (mitigating User Errors). The variance remaining in the VaR results provides
us with an estimate of the magnitude of Systems Risk. However these risk estimates are
still subject to potential biases; first there is the tendency to underestimate Systems Risk.
After all, we made it very clear to vendors that the results (and any discrepancies) would
be made public in both academic and practitioner journals. We believe this meant that
extra care was taken. On the other hand, as in any empirical test, Systems Risk may have
been overestimated, since real money was not at stake, so many of the organizational
safeguards (such as Back Office reconciliations, P&L, and Audit) were not in place.
11 The test portfolio is described in the appendix and is also available on the World Wide Web at:
http://misdba.hbs.harvard.edu/cmarshall/mitstudy.
12 One vendor gave us three different iterations of VaR results, several others gave us two iterations.
13 User Risk is the risk of different users using the same model and tool to produce different results for the
same task.
14 System Errors or User Errors occur when developers or users make assumptions that are inconsistent
with those made elsewhere in the model, the model’s implementation in software, or its usage.
93. PRE-EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Structural Analysis Of The Portfolio
One of the easiest ways to understand derivative instruments, is in terms of basic building
blocks, such as money markets, forwards, and options (Smith 1993; Smithson 1987).
Different instrument classes in the test portfolio are also structurally related, providing
clues as to the source of the additional variance in the risk assessment caused as new
building blocks are pieced together to form more complex instruments.
Table 2: Instrument Structure
This structural model of the instruments suggests (but does not necessarily imply) a
similar structure for the variance of the different instrument classes. According to
elementary Error Analysis, when we combine two simple instrument types to produce a
third, we expect the variance of the combination instrument estimates to be both greater
10than that of either of its components, and less than that of the components’ sum of
variances. This is a result of the uncertain y (reflected in the variance of the instrument
samples) in estimating VaR for each of the component instruments, increasing the
uncertainty in estimating VaR for the composite. This said, it should be noted that the
composite instrument classes in the test portfolio, while structurally equivalent to
combinations of other instrument classes, are not exactly equivalent, since each
instrument class contains multiple instantiations of the instrument. Nevertheless, the
structure of the instruments described above leads us to hypothesize the following
relationships between instrument class’ sample relative Standard Deviation (SDev).
15
1) SDev (Money Market) < SDev (Government Bonds)
2) SDev (Money Market) < SDev (Interest Rate Swap)
3) SDev (Money Market) < SDev (FRAs)
4) SDev (FX Option) < SDev (Interest Rate Options)
5) SDev (FRAs) < SDev (Interest Rate Swap)
6) SDev (Money Market) < SDev (FXF)
3.2 Vendor Expectations
We also asked that vendors
16 express the degree of difficulty they had in evaluating the
VaR of a particular asset class (1 -Low Effort though 7-High Effort).
Table 3: Perceived Complexity of the Asset Class
Non-linear instruments such as options, particularly Interest Rate Options, were
perceived as the most complex. The simplest asset classes were those with the smallest
15 In this study, because of the limited number of data points, we calculated relative standard deviation as
sample standard deviation divided by the sample median.
16 To preserve anonymity, throughout the rest of this document, vendors are identified by letters (A
though H) and vendors’ systems by letter. number combinations (e.g. A. 1 is one of vendor A’s systems).
11number of cash flows, such as money markets and FX forwards, and to some extent,
FRAs. We hypothesized that the perceived difficulty of VaR estimation for an asset
class would be positively related to the variance in the VaR estimates for that asset class.
4. RESULTS
Going from those asset classes least susceptible to Systems Risk to those most
susceptible, we describe vendors’ estimates of VaR. Then, we make use of the extensive
feedback from the vendors, to suggest likely drivers for any variance in the results despite
the obvious limitations imposed upon us by a small sample size.
Table 4: VaR of FX Forward Portfolio
The first thing to note is the similarity of all the parametric results for FX forwards.
There are no major outliers. This suggests the ease with which firms can map forward
payments in different currencies to spot plus forward payments of the domestic
currency. This was also confirmed by the ease with which users described the task
estimating VaR for FX forwards.
Some of the variance in the VaR estimates can be accounted for by differences in the
12valuations upon which VaR is based. Conceptually we can see that the relation between
variance in valuation and variance in risk assessment is approximately linear from the
following fictional simplification of the VaR calculation.
VaR = 1.65 x Standard Deviation of Outcomes x Value
If the standard deviation of outcomes involves no uncertainty (i.e. is constant across implementations)
then:
This suggests that the VaR calculation introduces systems risk beyond that introduced by
valuation, to the extent that the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of VaR exceeds
that of the valuation.
17 This is tested in the following table:
This suggests that the VaR variation is almost certainly the result of variance in
valuations.
18 This is consistent with the vendors’ beliefs that FX forwards are the least
sensitive of all the asset classes to the precise choice of assumptions made. Despite a
small number of data points, this was strongly borne out by our results, with very small
(although non-zero) discrepancies between systems. What variation there is, appears
17 The difficulties in model-based valuation is discussed in earlier research by Tanya Beder (1994) and a
recent Bank of England study on Valuation practices in banks (Weston and Cooper 1996).
18 Interestingly, it also suggests that the VaR estimation for FX forwards is relatively insensitive to
valuation differences.
13entirely the result of differences in valuations. We can conclude that for FX forwards,
more than for any other asset class in the test portfolio, RiskMetrics™ VaR becomes an
highly effective standard with strictly limited systems risk.
4.2 Money Market Deposits
Table 6: VaR of Money Market Portfolio
Money markets were ranked by vendors to be like FX forwards in their relative
complexity. Vendors also believed money market deposits to be among the least sensitive
of the linear asset classes to the precise choice of assumptions made. Consequently, we
would expect a standard model to have few difficulties in producing consistent results.
And for the most part this is the case, with the only outlier of note, that of system A; it’s
estimate, while consistent with some simulation-based results obtained for the same
portfolio, is lower that that of all the other parametric estimates. While we have no
evidence concerning A’s valuation, we suspect that it’s VaR and that of J (also lower than
most of other estimates) were caused by lower valuations. This was also suggested by
the large importance of the FX risk as a component of the total DEaR.
14Some of the vendors provided the following valuations of the money market positions:
Table 7: Money Market Valuations
The similarity of the relative standard deviation of the valuations to that of the VaR
estimates suggests that amongst these systems, most, if not all the variance in the VaR
estimate comes from variance in the valuations. Although, as with the bonds, these
vendors had less variance in their estimates than did many of the others in the sample. So
while valuation may have been the predominant source of variance in VaR for these
vendors, other VaR-specific factors may have been responsible for some of the variance in
the rest of the vendors’ estimates of VaR. To summarize, money markets were well
suited to the RiskMetrics™ model, although not to the same extent as FX forwards.
Money markets thus involved a small but significant systems risk, greater than that for
forwards, but less than all other asset classes.
4.3 Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs)
Table 8: VaR of FRA Portfolio
For FRAs, like the structurally similar money markets, we saw a fairly wide range (10%)
in the VaR estimates. This variance was also reflected in the relatively high complexity
15ranking vendors gave to the asset class. Although there were no outliers, there was also
no clear clustering around a particular estimate. Like FX forwards, as there are only two
cash flows to map, there should be a limit to the effect of different assumptions regarding
mapping.
Table 9: FRA Valuations
The two valuations available to us suggested marginally that valuation was only partly
responsible for variance in the VaR estimates. To summarize, FRAs look much like
money market deposits in the ease of VaR estimation. Unlike money markets, there are
some indications that valuation is less the driving factor in the variance of VaR estimation.
Hence, Systems Risk appears greater for FRAs than for forwards and money markets but
less than that for bonds and swaps.
Table 10: VaR of Bond Portfolio
First, note that there is little difference in the components of risk, but there is significant
variance in the aggregate Daily Earnings at Risk (DEaR) assessment. Second, most of this
16variance in the aggregate results comes from two outliers (vendors C and H. 1 ) both of
whom did not break down their VaR into FX and interest rate components. The narrow
range of VaR estimates is not surprising as bonds are relatively simple instruments (See
sections 4.10 and 4.11 ). Although we were unable to ascertain why these systems results
were outliers compared with the others, we do note that these results were compatible
with the results from simulations
19, and that one of the tools, C was a pre-release piece of
software. When these outliers are removed, the standard deviation/median estimate
decreases to less than one percent. This was in spite of different assumptions made by






Vendor E and J’s keeping basis point sensitivities across mapped vertices rather than
the RiskMetrics™ approach of maintaining variance.
Use of different daycount schemes: We suggested that vendors use the day count
conventions in place in the exchanges where the products are traded. In some cases
however the systems had not implemented these options. The choice of day count
was thought to be most likely to make a difference for very short term bonds and
money market deposits. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the magnitude of the
effect was usually of the order of a fraction of a percentage point in the VaR estimate.
Interest rate calculations: Different exchanges and markets have slightly different
conventions regarding yield calculation. Unlike the daycount effect, this effect seems
to cause greater discrepancies as the maturity of the instrument increases.
Small differences in valuation dates: E’s numbers were calculated as of October 2,
1995 and not September 27.
Holidays and weekend adjustments: Theoretically, settlement and reset dates should
be adjusted if they fall on weekends or holidays. To do this requires significant
calculation as it implies keeping record of holidays in multiple markets as well as
relatively simple adjustments for leap years etc. Most of the vendors believed this to
19 While not the focus of this paper, we also compared parametric results with those obtained from non-
17have little effect and since there was a range of implementations on this issue, the data
largely confirms this.
Table 11: Bond Valuations
Although not all the valuations were available, the fact that the VaR estimates vary much
more than do the valuations suggests that valuations are a only partial driver of variance in
VaR. However, even when the H.1 outlier is taken out, although valuation becomes much
more important as a driver of variance in the VaR estimates, it still only drives half the
variance in the VaR results. The variance not accounted for by valuations is probably due
to a combination of the factors discussed above. To summarize, system risk is generally
small for bonds using the RiskMetrics™ model, but significant outliers do exist.
Valuation accounts for at most half of the variance in the VaR results with the remaining
variance believed to be caused by differences in mapping and other factors. Bonds appear
to become more complex and thus more likely to produce outliers in VaR as the number
of coupons increases.
parametric models, such as Monte Carlo and Historical Simulation,
184.5 Interest Rate Swaps
Table 12: VaR of Swap Portfolio
The Swap results present a major contrast with those of the bonds. For swaps there is
much greater variation in the VaR estimates, i.e., Systems risk appears to be greater for
swaps than it was for bonds. Systems A and G are outliers, but their removal from the
sample does not eliminate the relative standard deviation which decreases to about 8°/0.
G’s estimates are based on their assumption that all the fixed legs and all the floating legs
of the swap should contribute to the interest rate risk component of the swap, whereas
other vendors assumed that all the fixed legs but only the first floating leg should
contribute to interest rate risk. All the vendors had widely different allocations to FX
risk. We believe that this was due to differences in valuation, as spot FX risk is a direct
function of the instruments net present value. Several vendors believed the VaR of the
swap was especially (i.e. more than the other linear instruments) sensitive to the swap’s
valuation.
19The following table shows the vendors’ valuations:
Table 13: Swap VaR and Valuations
Here we see much greater variance in the valuations of swaps than were seen in the bond
valuations, but a similar variance in the VaR estimates. This suggests that while
estimation of VaR for swaps is similarly difficult to VaR estimation of bonds, swap
valuation poses greater difficulties. In both swaps and bonds, it appears that about half
the variance in VaR estimates is the result of variance in the valuations. To summarize,
the choice of whether to map one or multiple floating legs contributes most to variance in
the swap VaR, with much of the remaining variance driven by discrepancies in the
valuations. Presumably, like bonds, some swaps’ large number of cash flows means that
mapping differences may also responsible for some additional variance.
20Table 14: VaR of the FX Option Portfolio
For the non-linear instruments, we include a number of non-parametric results obtained
from various vendors. Vendors used a range of non-parametric models including full-
valuation (F), Monte Carlo simulation (H.3), Historical Simulation (H.2), Structured
Monte Carlo Simulation based on the 95th percentile (J.2), and Structured Monte Carlo
Simulation based on a multiple (1.65) of the standard deviation (J.3).
20 In one case, a vendor (H.3) provided us with different results estimated using the same methodology
(e.g. historical simulation) but using different datasets. In accordance with our earlier definition of a
model, i.e., “a system of postulates and data”, these are considered distinct models.
21Obviously these do not tell us anything about Systems Risk but as with the studies by
Hendricks and Beder mentioned earlier, they do reveal the relative magnitude of systems
risk compared to model risk. The first thing to notice about the option results, is that
even using the parametric model of RiskMetrics™ is no guarantee to producing consistent
results. The parametric results obtained had significant variation. This should be seen as
reiterating many vendors’ concerns about using a parametric model for the assessment of
the risk of non-linear instruments, because of the parametric model assumption that the
sensitivity of the derivative value with respect to the underlying rates (delta) is constant.
For far out of the money options this might be a reasonable assumption, but a more
general portfolio such as we have here, the assumption breaks down. The choice of a
different risk model such as Full Valuation or Simulation incorporating vega and gamma
risks can have a massive impact on the VaR estimation. Because of their non-linear
nature, options also appear sensitive to the detailed assumptions regarding day counts,
interest calculations and holiday assumptions. However, in general, FX options appear
less sensitive to these assumptions than do the interest rate options discussed in the next
section. FX options were however highly sensitive to the precise choice of risk model
(full vs. delta valuation) used. Like all options, FX options were highly sensitive to the
choice of volatilities used.
The second observation from the results is that the non-parametric results varied more
widely than the parametric results, suggesting that model risk is greater than system risk
for this asset class.
Table 15: FX Option Valuations
It appears the wide variation in valuation only partly explains the variation in VaR
results. To summarize, FX options are non-linear in their dependence on the underlying
risk factors used in RiskMetrics™. Consequently, they are very sensitive to the precise
22assumptions made in the system and the model. Both systems and model risks are higher
than for any linear instrument. This said, it appears the least likely of the two non-linear
asset classes considered in the test portfolio to be mis-specified, since mapping is a minor
issue, and valuation relatively straightforward.
4.7 Interest Rate Caps and Floors
Table 16: VaR of the IR Option Portfolio
All of the three parametric estimates were very close in their interest rate risks. Two of
the three were close in the FX risks and total DEaR. Neither we, nor vendor G, know
why G's results were so different. There was also extensive model variation. For interest
rate options, most of the discrepancies seem to be due to the choice of model, followed
by variation in the valuation of the portfolio. Repeatedly, vendors were dubious about
23the effectiveness of parametric methods for interest rate options because of the
significance of their non-delta risks. The added complexity of the interest rate options is
also seen in their use of additional models of interest rate term structure. Combining these
models itself increases the complexity and increases the likelihood of user and
implementation error. Despite the very small number of data points, but consistent with
these concerns, interest rate options appear to have the highest model and systems risk of
all the instruments considered in this test portfolio.
Table 17: Valuations of the IR Option Portfolio
Variation in valuations appears responsible for a smaller part of the variation in VaR than
it was for FX options. This suggests that the risk assessment of interest rate options is
more complex than that of FX options even though the valuation appears easier. To
summarize, model and systems risks were more similar for interest rate options, and
generally larger than for any other asset class in the portfolio. Valuation is less obviously
a driver of variance in VaR than it was for FX options.
244.8 Comparative Analysis of Aggregate Tool Results
The vendors also produced assessments of VaR for the complete portfolio using
RiskMetrics™ Parametric techniques. In our portfolio, we asked that vendors assume
complete diversification of risks both across, and within, different asset classes. These
Table 18: Aggregate VaR Estimates
Note the wide range of results even for the RiskMetrics™-based results. Surprisingly
variation at the aggregate level is greater than that at asset class level. This suggests that
Systems Risk may be a systematic risk, since diversification has little effect on the total
variance. It is also interesting to note that in the case of the aggregate portfolio, we see
25greater variation in the RiskMetrics™ based VaR results than we do using various non-
parametric models. This said, most of the variation reflects the importance of the bonds
in the aggregate portfolio and thus probably underestimates the inaccuracies in estimating
the aggregate VaR. Also, less surprisingly, non linear instruments showed much greater
model and systems risks than did linear instruments.
4.9 Corroboration of Researcher Expectations
The expectations of the researchers discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 with one exception
were corroborated in the results:
1) SDev (Money Market) (9%) < SDev (Government Bonds) (17%) TRUE
2) SDev (Money Market) (9%) < SDev (Interest Rate Swap) (21%) TRUE
3) SDev (Money Market) (9%) < SDev (FRAs) (10%) TRUE
4) SDev (FX Option) (25%) < SDev (Interest Rate Options) (28%) TRUE
5) SDev (FRAs) (10%) < SDev (Interest Rate Swap) (21%) TRUE
6) SDev (Money Market) (9%) < SDev (FX Forwards) (l%) FALSE
Obviously with such small samples, there is also a large confidence interval around these
estimates of variance. This error also prevents us from definitively expecting the
structural relation being reflected in the variance of the estimates, nevertheless, the results
are suggestive.
264.10 Corroboration Of Vendor Expectations
We plotted vendors’ prior perceptions of 
the difficulty of performing the risk
assessment of a particular asset class
against the standard deviation (as a 
0/0 of the
mean) of the VaR estimates of the sample
to see if there was any relationship. There
was a clear correlation; not that this can be
misinterpreted to infer causation between  Figure 1: Systems Risk and Perceived
these variables, since both variables are Complexity
actually proxies for a more fundamental metric of complexity associated with each asset
class. Nevertheless, the validation of both the researchers’ and the vendors’ prior
expectations does increase confidence in the general validity of the data, despite
understandable concerns over the small size of the sample.
275. CONCLUSIONS
The extent to which different vendors produced similar estimates was closely tied to the
nature of the instrument.
21 The importance of systems risks for each asset class is shown
graphically and in tabular form below:
Table 19: Variance in the VaR Results
Implicit in this study is our assumption that a necessary condition for a model to be a
potential standard is that it involves limited or quantifiable systems risk. Therefore from
21 To some extent this clashes with the work of Beder ( 1995), who found little systematic behavior in the
errors according to different methodologies. She however compared across models rather than
implementation, which presumably introduced a great deal of additional variance in the results.
28the data, it appears that RiskMetrics™ provides a useful benchmark for FX forwards,
money markets, and FRAs, somewhat less useful for bonds and swaps, and has major
weaknesses dealing with non-linear instruments such as FX options and interest rate caps
and floors. Divergence in FX risk seems to be driven by variations in valuation, but there
also appears to be other significant factors driving variation in interest rate risk
assessment. The authors note that criticism of any model can be over done; the decision
to use the RiskMetrics™ model must be made in the context of alternative models. For
FX options, model risk appears much greater than Systems Risk; for interest rate
options, model risk is similar in magnitude to Systems Risk. In addition, Systems and
Model Risks are not necessarily a threat to the accurate measurement of the total financial
risk of a portfolio, provided users can obtain reasonable estimates of the magnitude of
Systems and Model Risks. Given these estimates, we can then adjust the market risk-
based VaR estimate to include Model and Systems Risks. The details of just how to do
this are explained in a forthcoming paper by the authors.
Finally, our results suggest that Systems Risk should be an important concern of any user
of a Value at Risk model. We found wide variation in VaR results produced even using
the same model, and variation that was related to increasing complexity of asset class. We
note the extreme sensitivity of the results on the detailed assumptions embedded in the
models and the systems by highly skilled professionals. This is all too often forgotten by
firms’ senior management who may assume that formal models (such as that provided by
J.P. Morgan’s RiskMetrics™) specifies algorithms, and therefore results completely.
6. FUTURE RESEARCH
While this study provides research methods and a framework for understanding Model
and System Risk, we believe the most effective way to estimate the Systems and Model
Risk is through a large-scale regulator-mandated survey of Risk/Valuation models and
their implementations. The Bank of England survey (Weston and Cooper 1996) is an
early attempt to do for banks’ internal valuation models.





systems vendorsmust perform in order to obtain some industry-wide seal of approval. The development
of such a series of test would have other effects. Because of the secrecy and the
competitiveness of the member firms, there are few resources available in the financial
services industry for a relatively unbiased assessment and comparison of model and
systems. We hope that this research builds the foundation of a more detailed research
program geared to the detailed cataloging, sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis of
such complex financial models as well as pointing the way towards a more systematic
management of firms’ financial models, their implementations, and their use.
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many individuals and organizations contributed extensively to this study: First and
foremost has been the support of MIT’s Finance Research Center. Jacques Longerstaey,
and Scott Howard at J. P. Morgan have also been extremely supportive throughout. And
of course, we must thank the representatives from the risk management systems vendors
who gave of their time, and gathered much of the data from which we produced this
report, these include: Michael Zerbs and Galia Tylman at Algorithmic, Dave Coxell and
Verka Slanicka at Brady, Jerry Bock, and Kenneth Inman at C.ATS, Mark Garman and
Chris Fehily at FEA, Anthony Chiu from Infinity, Jay Kemp Smith at Leading Market
Technologies, Risto Lehtinen from Oy Trema, Ann Rodriguez from Price Waterhouse,
Ralph Herdman at Renaissance, Peter Davies at Sailfish, Bozena Walla from Softek, Dan
Rissin from TrueRisk, and Eric Reichenberg at Wall Street Systems.
308. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beder, T. S. (1994). “The Realities of Marking to Model.” Bank Accounting and Finance 7(4):
Beder, T. S. (1995). “VaR: Seductive but dangerous.” Financial Analysts Journal 1995(Sept-Oct):
Beckstrom, R. and A. Campbell (1995). An Introduction to VaR. CATS Software.
Derman, E. (1996). Model Risk. Risk Magazine. 9:
G30, G. D. S. G. (1993). Derivatives: Practices and Principles. G30.
Guldimann, T. (1995). RiskMetrics-Technical Document. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.
Hendricks, D. (1996). “Evaluation of Value at Risk Models using Historical Data.” Federal Reserve Bank
New York Economic Policy Review 1996(April):
Lawrence, C. and G. Robinson (1995). “How safe is RiskMetrics?” Risk 8(l):
Leong, K. (1996). The Right Approach. Risk Magazine. 1996:
Longerstaey, J. and P. Zangari (1995). A Transparent Tool. Risk. 8:
Bank for International Settlements, (1994). Public Disclosure of Market and Credit Risks by Financial
Intermediaries (Fisher Report). Eurocurrency Standing Committee of the Central Banks of the Group of
Ten Countries.
Smith, D. J. (1993). The Arithmetic of Financial Engineering. The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory
meets Practice. New York, NY, McGraw Hill. 401-410.
Smithson, C. W. (1987). “A Lego Approach to Forwards, Futures, Swaps and Options.” Midland
Corporate Finance Journal 4(4): 16-29.
Weston, S. and S. Cooper (1996). Bank Checks. Risk Magazine. 9:
31APPENDIX A: Test Portfolio given to Vendors
3233